




TWO CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTION 
IN RISK REGULATION 
DAN M. KAHAN†
Recent work in cognitive and social psychology makes it clear that emotion 
plays a critical role in public perceptions of risk, but doesn’t make clear exactly 
what that role is or why it matters.  This Article examines two competing theo-
ries of risk perception, which generate two corresponding understandings of 
emotion and its significance for risk regulation.  The “irrational weigher” the-
ory asserts that laypersons’ emotional apprehensions of risk are heuristic substi-
tutes for more reflective judgments, and as such lead to systematic errors.  It 
therefore counsels that risk regulation be assigned to politically insulated experts 
whose judgments are free of emotion’s distorting impact.  The “cultural evalua-
tor” theory, in contrast, asserts that emotional apprehensions of risk reflect per-
sons’ expressive appraisals of putatively dangerous activities.  It implies that 
emotional apprehensions of risk should at least sometimes be afforded normative 
weight in law and also generates distinctive strategies for reconciling sound risk 
regulation with genuinely participatory, democratic policymaking. 
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Are emotions subversive of reason or essential constituents of it?  
Do they defeat realization of our ends by enfeebling our calculative 
faculties, inducing us to form deluded beliefs, and undermining our 
wills?  Or do they perfect our rationality by supplying us with a capac-
ity to perceive which states of affairs express our values, the motivation 
to pursue those conditions, and the power to imagine contingencies 
that threaten or advance them?  These questions have long divided 
both philosophers and psychologists.1  Competing answers contend 
with one another in law as well.2
1 See generally JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND:  RATIONALITY AND THE EMO-
TIONS 283-328 (1999) (canvassing positions on both sides); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
THE THERAPY OF DESIRE:  THEORY AND PRACTICE IN HELLENISTIC ETHICS 79-96 (1994) 
(developing an Aristotelian rejoinder to the separation of emotion and reason); MI-
CHAEL STOCKER WITH ELIZABETH HEGEMAN, VALUING EMOTIONS 91-121 (1996) (de-
scribing and attacking the position that sees emotion as opposed to reason). 
2 See, for example, James Madison’s statement that: 
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, 
and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of 
its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, 
stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by 
the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which 
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.  In 
these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temper-
ate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career 
and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until 
reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? 
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 371 ( James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).  Contrast 
this with the following statement of Justice Brennan:  “In our own time, attention to 
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Recent advances in the study of risk perception seem to furnish 
decisive evidence of emotion’s antagonism to reason.  A growing body 
of empirical research supplies compelling proof of the critical role 
that emotions play in the apprehension of personal and societal dan-
gers.3  This role, according to the predominant understanding, is a 
heuristic one.  Lacking access to sound empirical information, or the 
time and cognitive capacity to make sense of it, ordinary people con-
form their perceptions of risk to the visceral reactions that putatively 
dangerous activities evoke.4  These snap judgments might serve indi-
viduals better than nothing, the conventional account suggests.  But 
they don’t serve individuals nearly as well as the type of considered, 
reflective assessment for which they are a substitute.  A substantial 
body of writing in the field of risk perception documents the numer-
ous ways in which affect-driven risk appraisals lead ordinary people, 
and their popularly accountable representatives, to take positions in-
imical to society’s well-being.  The remedy, according to this work, is 
to shield law from the distorting influence of emotion, primarily by 
delegating regulatory power to politically insulated experts, who can 
evaluate the costs and benefits of asserted hazards (nuclear power, 
genetically modified foods, handguns, etc.) in a deliberate and rea-
soned fashion.5
My goal in this Article is to challenge this position.  I don’t mean 
to raise any question about the demonstrated centrality of emotions to 
risk perception, but only about the prevailing interpretation of it.  
The conclusion that emotional appraisals are irrational is integral, I’ll 
argue, to a model of risk perception that sees the positions people 
take toward putatively dangerous activities as reflecting their implicit 
(and usually skewed) weighing of instrumental costs and benefits.  I 
experience may signal that the greatest threat to due process principles is formal rea-
son severed from the insights of passion.”  William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and 
“The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 17 (1988).  See generally Dan M. Kahan 
& Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
269 (1996) (exploring the disparate treatment of emotions and reason within criminal 
law). 
3 See generally Paul Slovic et al., Affect, Risk, and Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSY-
CHOL. S35 (supp. 2005) (examining recent developments in psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience regarding risk as feelings and its influence on decision making). 
4 See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 280 
(2001) (“[P]eople often experience a discrepancy between the fear they experience in 
connection with a particular risk and their cognitive evaluation of the threat posed by 
that risk.”). 
5 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 126 
(2005). 
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will lay emphasis instead on an account that sees risk perceptions as 
embodying individuals’ cultural evaluations of the meanings expressed 
by society’s decision to tolerate or abate particular risks.6  This model 
of risk perception, I’ll argue, suggests that emotion functions not as a 
heuristic substitute for considered appraisals of information but 
rather as a perceptive faculty uniquely suited to discerning what stance 
toward risk best coheres with a person’s values.  Without the power 
this affective capacity supplies, it would be impossible for individuals 
to form rational cultural evaluations of risk.  This account suggests that 
it would also be a mistake to seal off risk regulation from the influence 
of affect-driven risk appraisals or to assume that affect-driven apprais-
als cannot themselves be influenced by education and deliberation. 
I will develop this argument in three steps.  I will begin, in Part I, 
by describing three theories of risk perception, two of which treat 
emotion as essential to the cognition of risk.  In Part II, I will canvass 
empirical findings that bear on these alternative understandings of 
how emotion contributes to risk perception.  Finally, in Part III, I will 
examine what is at stake as a normative and prescriptive matter in the 
contest between these two conceptions of emotion in risk regulation. 
I.  THREE THEORIES OF RISK PERCEPTION, 
TWO CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTION 
The profound impact of emotion on risk perception cannot be se-
riously disputed.  Distinct emotional states—from fear to dread to an-
ger to disgust7—and distinct emotional phenomena—from affective 
orientations to symbolic associations and imagery8—have been found 
to explain perceptions of the dangerousness of all manner of activities 
6 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:  A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on 
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083-88 (2006) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 5) (dis-
cussing how cultural values shape risk perception). 
7 See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 117-18 (2000) (dread); Valerie 
Curtis & Adam Biran, Dirt, Disgust, and Disease:  Is Hygiene in Our Genes?, 44 PERSP. BI-
OLOGY & MED. 17 (2001) (disgust); Ellen M. Peters et al., An Emotion-Based Model of Risk 
Perception and Stigma Susceptibility:  Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reactivity, 
Worldviews, and Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological Stigma, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 
1349 (2004) (fear and anger). 
8 See generally Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, Affective Asynchrony and the Measurement of 
the Affective Attitude Component, 21 COGNITION & EMOTION 300 (2007) (evaluating emo-
tions as constructed through imagery or holistic evaluations). 
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and things—from pesticides9 to mobile phones,10 from red meat con-
sumption11 to cigarette smoking.12
More amenable to dispute, however, is exactly why emotions exert 
this influence.  Obviously, emotions work in conjunction with more 
discrete mechanisms of cognition in some fashion.  But which ones 
and how?  To sharpen the assessment of the evidence that bears on 
these questions, I will now sketch out three alternative models of risk 
perception—the rational weigher, the irrational weigher, and the cul-
tural evaluator theories—and their respective accounts of what (if any-
thing) emotions contribute to the cognition of risk. 
A.  The Rational Weigher Theory:  Emotion as Byproduct 
Based on the premises of neoclassical economics, the rational 
weigher theory asserts that individuals, over time and in aggregate, proc-
ess information about risky undertakings in a way that maximizes their 
expected utility.  The decision whether to accept hazardous occupa-
tions in exchange for higher wages,13 to engage in unhealthy forms of 
recreation in exchange for hedonic pleasure,14 to accept intrusive 
9 See Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relation-
ship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1085, 1090-91 (1994) 
(revealing an inverse correlation between perceived risk and perceived benefit for sev-
eral items, including pesticides). 
10 See Michael Siegrist et al., Perception of Mobile Phone and Base Station Risks, 25 RISK 
ANALYSIS 1253 (2005). 
11 See Mariëtte Berndsen & Joop van der Pligt, Risks of Meat:  The Relative Impact of 
Cognitive, Affective and Moral Concerns, 44 APPETITE 195, 203-04 (2005). 
12 See Slovic et al., supra note 3, at S39 (discussing affective impulses risk percep-
tion and the decision to smoke cigarettes). 
13 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE:  REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN 
THE WORKPLACE 3 (1983) (“If workers understand the risks they face on hazardous 
jobs, they will demand additional compensation to take such jobs.”). 
14 See, e.g., TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUB-
LIC HEALTH:  THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4-10 (1993) (model-
ing the rational choice between safe and risky sexual activity); W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-
FILLED ROOMS:  A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 136 (2002) (finding that, de-
spite assumptions to the contrary, “available evidence demonstrates that people are 
aware that smoking is in fact quite risky for one’s health”). 
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regulation to mitigate threats to national security15 or the environ-
ment,16 all turn on a utilitarian balancing of costs and benefits. 
On this theory, emotions don’t make any contribution to the cog-
nition of risk.  They enter into the process, if they do at all, only as re-
active byproducts of individuals’ processing of information:  if a risk 
appears high relative to benefits, individuals will likely experience a 
negative emotion (perhaps fear, dread, or anger), whereas if the risk 
appears low, they will likely experience a positive one (such as hope or 
relief).17  This relationship is depicted as Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:  The Rational Weigher Theory of Risk Perception 
 
 
B.  The Irrational Weigher Theory:  Emotions as Bias 
The irrational weigher theory asserts that individuals lack the capacity 
to process information that maximizes their expected utility.  Because 
of constraints on information, time, and computational power, ordi-
nary individuals must resort to heuristic substitutes for considered 
analysis; those heuristics, moreover, invariably cause individuals’ 
evaluations of risks to err in substantial and recurring ways.18  Much of 
contemporary social psychology and behavioral economics has been 
dedicated to cataloging the myriad distortions—from the “availability 
15 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT:  THE CONSTITUTION IN A 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 23-25 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court evalu-
ates constitutional challenges to national security policies by weighing their costs and 
benefits). 
16 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:  RISK AND RESPONSE 14 (2004) (ad-
vocating the use of cost-benefit analysis by regulators when shaping responses to catas-
trophic risk). 
17 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 276-78 (discussing the impact of risk 
probability on emotions). 
18 See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (explaining “bounded rationality,” which theorizes 
that even when aware of our own cognitive limitations, human behavior differs from 
that expected by entirely rational actors). 
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cascades”19 to “probability neglect”20 to “overconfidence bias”21 to 
“status quo bias”22—that systematically skew risk perceptions, particu-
larly those of the lay public. 
For the irrational weigher theory, the contribution that emotion 
makes to risk perception is, in the first instance, a heuristic one.  Indi-
viduals rely on their visceral, affective reactions to compensate for the 
limits on their ability to engage in more considered assessments.23  
More specifically, irrational weigher theorists have identified emotion 
or affect as a central component of “System 1 reasoning,” which is 
“fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally 
charged,”24 as opposed to “System 2 reasoning,” which is “slower, se-
rial, effortful, and deliberately controlled”25 and typically involves 
“execution of learned rules.”26  System 1 is clearly adaptive in the 
main—heuristic reasoning furnishes guidance when lack of time, in-
formation, and cognitive ability make more systematic forms of rea-
19 See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regula-
tion, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1998) (analyzing the correlation between an idea’s per-
ceived credibility and its availability in public discourse). 
20 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Probability Neglect:  Emotions, Worst Cases, and 
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002) (discussing the tendency to focus on the attributes of an 
emotionally charged negative outcome, rather than its likelihood). 
21 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff et al., Knowing with Certainty:  The Appropriateness of Ex-
treme Confidence, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 
552 (1977) (discussing the tendency to overestimate degrees of certainty). 
22 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197-99 (1991) (discussing the tendency to prefer the 
current state of affairs, even in the face of advantageous alternatives). 
23 See Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings:  Some Thoughts About Af-
fect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 313-14 (2004) (“Although 
analysis is certainly important in some decision-making circumstances, reliance on af-
fect and emotion is a quicker, easier, and more efficient way to navigate in a complex, 
uncertain, and sometimes dangerous world.”).  See generally Loewenstein et al., supra 
note 4, at 269-70 (“Research on anxiety, for example, shows that emotional reactions 
to a risky situation often diverge from cognitive evaluations of risk severity.”). 
24 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:  Psychology for Behavioral Econom-
ics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003). 
25 Id. 
26 Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 
26 (2005).  The “System 1”/“System 2” distinction is one of a family of “dual-process” 
reasoning theories that contrast heuristic reasoning, typically emotional in nature, with 
more systematic, deductive forms of reasoning.  See generally Shelly Chaiken & Yaakov 
Trope, Preface to DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, at ix, ix (Shelly 
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (introducing the distinction between “dual-
process models”). 
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soning infeasible—but it remains obviously “error prone” in compari-
son to the more the “more deliberative [and] calculative” System 2.27
Indeed, according to the irrational weigher theory, emotion-
pervaded forms of heuristic reasoning can readily transmute into bias.  
The point isn’t merely that emotion-pervaded reasoning is less accu-
rate than cooler, calculative reasoning; rather it’s that habitual sub-
mission to its emotional logic ultimately displaces reflective thinking, 
inducing “behavioral responses that depart from what individuals view 
as the best course of action”—or at least would view as best if their 
judgment were not impaired.28  Proponents of this view have thus 
linked emotion to nearly all the cognitive biases shown to distort risk 
perceptions, as shown in Figure 2.29
 
Figure 2:  Irrational Weigher Theory of Risk Perception 
 
 
C.  The Cultural Evaluator Theory:  Emotion as Expressive Perception 
Finally there’s the cultural evaluator theory of risk perception.  This 
model rests on a view of rational agency that sees individuals as con-
cerned not merely with maximizing their welfare in some narrow con-
sequentialist sense, but also with adopting stances toward states of af-
27 SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 68. 
28 Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 271. 
29 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38-39, 41, 64 (explaining how availability ef-
fect, status quo bias, and probability neglect influence decision making); Loewenstein 
et al., supra note 4, at 271, 275-76 (detailing how overconfidence, vividness/availability, 
and insensitivity to probability affect perceptions of risk).  But see discussion infra Part 
II.A-B (describing and critiquing the irrational weigher theory). 
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fairs that appropriately express the values that define their identities.30  
Often when an individual is assessing what position to take on a puta-
tively dangerous activity, she is, on this account, not weighing (ration-
ally or irrationally) her expected utility but rather evaluating the social 
meaning of that activity.31  Against the background of cultural norms 
(particularly contested ones), would the law’s designation of that ac-
tivity as inimical to society’s well-being affirm her values or denigrate 
them?32
Like the irrational weigher theory, the cultural evaluator theory 
treats emotions as entering into the cognition of risk.  But it offers a 
very different account of how—one firmly aligned with the position 
that sees emotions as constituents of reason. 
Martha Nussbaum describes emotions as “judgments of value.”33 
They orient a person who values some good, endowing her with the 
attitude that appropriately expresses her regard for that good in the 
face of a contingency that either threatens or advances it.  On this ac-
count, for example, grief is the uniquely appropriate and accurate 
judgment for someone who values another who has died; fear is the 
appropriate and accurate judgment for someone who values her or 
another’s well-being in the face of an impending threat to it; anger is 
the appropriate and accurate judgment for someone who values her 
own honor in response to an action that conveys insufficient respect.  
People who fail to experience these emotions under such circum-
stances—or who experience these or other emotions in circumstances 
that do not warrant them—lack a capacity of discernment essential to 
30 See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993) 
(proposing a theory of rational action that defines such as action that “adequately ex-
presses . . . rational attitudes toward people and other intrinsically valuable things”). 
31 See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
943 (1995) (arguing that social meanings exist as a general societal backdrop and ex-
ert influence over action and decision making). 
32 See generally Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1087-88 (explaining that individuals 
conform their perceptions of an activity to “positive or negative social meanings,” 
which are governed by cultural norms). 
33 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT:  THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS 19 (2001) (“Emotions . . . involve judgments about important things . . . in 
which, appraising an external object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge 
our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully 
control.”). 
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their flourishing as agents capable of holding values and pursuing 
them.34
Rooted heavily in Aristotelian philosophy, Nussbaum’s account is, 
as she herself points out,35 amply grounded in modern empirical work 
in psychology and neuroscience.  Antonio Damasio’s influential “so-
matic marker” account, for example, identifies emotions with a par-
ticular area in the brain.36  Persons who have suffered damage to that 
part of the brain display impaired capacity to recognize or imagine 
conditions that might affect goods they care about, and thus lack mo-
tivation to respond accordingly.  They are perceived by others and of-
ten by themselves as mentally disabled in a distinctive way, as suffering 
from a profound kind of moral and social obtuseness that makes them 
incapable of engaging the world in a way that matches their own 
ends.37  If being rational consists, at least in part, of “see[ing] which 
values [we] hold” and knowing how to “deploy these values in [our] 
judgments,” then “those who are unaware of their emotions or of 
their emotional lacks” will necessarily be deficient in a capacity essen-
tial to being “a rational person.”38
The cultural evaluator theory views emotions as enabling indi-
viduals to perceive what stance toward risks coheres with their values.  
Cultural norms obviously play a role in shaping the emotional reac-
tions people form toward activities such as nuclear power, handgun 
possession, homosexuality, and the like.39  When people draw on their 
emotions to judge the risk that such an activity poses, they form an 
expressively rational attitude about what it would mean for their cul-
34 See id. at 19-77 (explaining and defending the neo-Stoic view of emotions as 
judgment, which holds emotions are the second step in a two-step process by which 
people accept, reject, or ignore perceptions as accurate depictions of reality). 
35 See id. at 93-119 (summarizing the historical response to the study of emotions 
and more recent research in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience); 
see also STOCKER WITH HEGEMAN, supra note 1, at 105-21 (linking the cultural evaluator 
theory to a myriad of sources, including psychoanalytic scholarship). 
36 See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR:  EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN 173-83 (1994) (discussing the way rational thoughts about bad out-
comes are preceded by an “unpleasant gut feeling” produced by a neural system in the 
prefrontal cortex). 
37 See id. at 34-79 (detailing the case study of Elliot, a man whose emotions and 
personality changed due to a brain tumor compressing his frontal lobes upwards, indi-
cating the connection between brain regions, reasoning, and decision making). 
38 STOCKER WITH HEGEMAN, supra note 1, at 105. 
39 See generally ELSTER, supra note 1, at 139-238 (discussing the historical develop-
ment of various emotions’ normative force); NUSSBAUM, supra note 33, at 139-44, 157-
65 (outlining various culturally “appropriate” responses to death, and their manifesta-
tions and psychological underpinnings). 
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tural worldviews for society to credit the claim that that activity is dan-
gerous and worthy of regulation, as depicted in Figure 3.  Persons who 
subscribe to an egalitarian ethic, for example, have been shown to be 
particularly sensitive to environmental and technological risks, the 
recognition of which coheres with condemnation of commercial ac-
tivities that generate distinctions in wealth and status.  Persons who 
hold individualist values, in contrast, tend to dismiss concerns about 
global warming, nuclear waste disposal, food additives, and the like—
an attitude that expresses their commitment to the autonomy of mar-
kets and other private orderings.40  Individualistic persons worry in-
stead about the risk that gun control—a policy that denigrates indi-
vidualist values—will render law-abiding citizens defenseless.41  
Persons who subscribe to hierarchical values worry about the dangers 
of drug distribution, homosexuality, and other forms of behavior that 
defy traditional norms.42
 
40 See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER:  AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF 
POLLUTION AND TABOO (1966) (explaining how various “primitive” and “advanced” 
civilizations have dealt with contagion and pollution); Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions 
in the Perception of Risk:  An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. 
CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61 (1991) (analyzing the industrialized world’s response to 
risks and opportunities associated with technological development); Aaron Wildavsky 
& Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception:  Who Fears What and Why?, 119 DAEDALUS 41, 44-
45 (1990) (exploring various explanatory models for why certain groups fear technol-
ogy while others revere it). 
41 See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition:  Explain-
ing the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 474-75 
(2007) (expanding on the theory that white men fear gun control because their hier-
archical cultural orientation causes them to associate gun possession with the role of 
father and protector). 
42 See Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 40, at 46 (“Due to the emphasis placed on 
obedience to authority within hierarchy, its supporters scorn deviant behavior.”); Dan 
M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study:  Making Sense of—and Making 
Progress in—the American Culture War of Fact 3-15 (George Wash. Univ. Legal Studies Re-
search Paper No. 370), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189 (exploring 
Americans’ views on several contemporary issues, including the “hierarchical” view on 
each); The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, National Risk and Culture 
Survey, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task= 
view&id=45 (last visited Jan. 20, 2008) (“[A]n 1800-person national survey . . . found 
that cultural worldviews better predicted perceptions of various risks than did any 
other individual characteristic.”). 
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Figure 3:  The Cultural Evaluator Theory of Risk Perception 
 
 
This account of emotion doesn’t see its function as a heuristic 
one.  That is, emotions don’t just enable a person to latch onto a posi-
tion in the absence of time to acquire and reflect on information.  
Rather, as a distinctive faculty of cognition, emotions perform a 
unique role in enabling her to identify the stance that is expressively 
rational for someone with her commitments.  Without the contribu-
tion that emotion makes to her powers of expressive perception, she 
would be lacking this vital incident of rational agency, no matter how 
much information, no matter how much time, and no matter how 
much computational acumen she possessed. 
II.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
So far, I have outlined three theories of risk perception and the 
corresponding accounts of emotion they support.  I now want to assess 
how well these theories fit the growing empirical literature on emo-
tion and risk perception. 
A.  The Cognitive Priority of Emotion to Risk Perception 
Among the most important empirical studies on emotion and risk 
perception are those that demonstrate the cognitive priority of the 
former.  Rather than conform their emotional appraisals of a puta-
tively dangerous activity (say, nuclear power generation) to their as-
sessment of its risks, individuals conform their assessments of its risks 
to their emotional appraisals.43
43 See Alhakami & Slovic, supra note 9, at 1095 (finding affective evaluation to be a 
strong predictor of perceived risk and benefit); Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect 
Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 3 (2000) 
(proposing that individuals make judgments using associations with positive and nega-
tive affective feelings); Ellen M. Peters et al., An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Perception 
and Stigma Susceptibility:  Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reactivity, Worldviews, 
and Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological Stigma, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1349, 1350 
(2004) (“[R]isk perceptions are primarily emotional phenomena with the emotions 
inextricably linked to how we think about technologies and what is communicated to 
us about those technologies.”).  See generally Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 270-71 
(distinguishing the risk-as-feelings hypothesis from other theories proposing that 
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This finding weighs decisively against the rational weigher theory 
of risk perception.  Because that theory assumes that individuals will 
rationally process information in a way that maximizes their expected 
utility, it doesn’t supply any reason to believe that persons who have 
different emotional reactions toward an activity will form different fac-
tual beliefs about its risks and benefits.44
The cognitive priority of emotion to risk perception is consistent, 
however, with the irrational weigher theory.  Under that theory, emo-
tions directly influence risk perceptions direction as a heuristic, Sys-
tem 1 substitute for more reflective System 2 reasoning, and indirectly 
as a distorting force on individuals’ processing of information. 
The cultural evaluator theory also asserts that emotion exerts a 
cognitive influence on risk perception—not by distorting the process-
ing of information, but by enabling individuals to perceive which 
stance toward risk rationally expresses their cultural worldviews.  Stud-
ies that tell us only that emotion is cognitively prior to risk percep-
tions, then, are equally compatible with both the cultural evaluator 
theory’s conception of emotion as expressive perception and the irra-
tional weigher theory’s conception of emotion as bias. 
B.  The Effects of Emotion on Information Processing 
Another class of studies purports to identify particular characteris-
tics of individuals’ risk perceptions that are plausibly viewed as evi-
dence of the impact of emotion on information processing.  Studies of 
this sort, however, also fail to resolve decisively the dispute between 
emotion as bias and emotion as expressive perception. 
One feature of risk perception said to bear the signature of emo-
tion is the unwillingness of individuals to adjust their decisions about 
the acceptability of risks to changes in information about their prob-
ability.45  System 2 reasoning requires not only that people form unbi-
ased assessments of the magnitude of risks and benefits, but also that 
they appropriately combine them to determine the expected utility of 
forgoing or forbearing them.  That doesn’t happen when people are 
“emotions often produce behavioral responses that depart from what individuals view 
as the best course of action”). 
44 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 267 (discussing the expected utility the-
ory, which posits that individuals assess risk according to the severity and probability of 
possible outcomes before arriving at a decision using an expectation-based calculus). 
45 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 276 -78 (providing an overview of studies 
suggesting insensitivity to probability variations). 
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emotional.  Instead they fail to discount a potential harm by its im-
probability—the phenomenon of “probability neglect”—because 
“when intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the ad-
verse outcome, not on its likelihood.”46  By the same token, when peo-
ple “anticipate a loss of what [they] now have, [they] can become 
genuinely afraid, in a way that greatly exceeds [their] feelings of 
pleasurable anticipation when [they] look forward to some supple-
ment to what [they] now have.”47  The result is “status quo” bias, the 
disposition to refrain from action that entails some risks but that 
nonetheless has a positive expected value.48  Alternatively, positive 
emotions—such as hope or pride—can lead to an “overconfidence 
bias” that induces people to underestimate risks associated with behav-
ior they value.49
But an alternative explanation, one in keeping with the cultural 
evaluator theory, is that individuals’ decisions to forgo or forbear risks 
is based not on the expected utility of those actions but on their social 
meanings, which are unlikely to be tied in any systematic way to the 
actuarial magnitude of those risks.  The individualist, for example, 
who continues to worry more about being rendered defenseless than 
about being shot as the risks of insufficient gun control appear to in-
crease50 might “not so much [be] afraid of dying as afraid of death 
without honor.”51  Similarly, for the person who values an activity—
say, smoking—precisely because she subscribes to an ethic that prizes 
the “authenticity of impulse and risk,” a cultivated disposition to dis-
count the likelihood of personal harm may be integral to the very 
form of life that activity helps her to experience.52  For such persons, 
46 SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 64. 
47 Id. at 41. 
48 Id. 
49 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 271 (“Numerous studies have found that 
people in good moods make optimistic judgments and choices and that people in bad 
moods make pessimistic judgments and choices.”). 
50 See The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, What Matters More-–
Consequences or Meanings?, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php? 
option=content&task=view&id=104 (last visited Jan. 20, 2008) (finding that 87% of 
study participants who oppose more gun control agreed that even if gun control 
greatly reduced crime, it would be wrong for the government to disallow law-abiding 
citizens from owning guns for self-protection). 
51 MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE:  AN ESSAY ON THE SE-
LECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 6 (1982). 
52 Joseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health, in SMOKING POL-
ICY:  LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 49, 66 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman 
eds., 1993). 
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moreover, the very idea of conforming their attitudes toward a risk to 
the results of a cost-benefit calculus might bear a meaning that deni-
grates their values.53
Another feature of popular risk perceptions that is thought to re-
flect the biasing effect of emotion is the tendency of individuals’ as-
sessments of risks and benefits to be inversely correlated.54  Rather 
than attend to information about a putatively dangerous activity in a 
deliberate and systematic fashion, it is said, individuals conform their 
assessments of all manner of information to their emotional apprais-
als, perhaps to avoid dissonance.55  This is a plausible reading of the 
results of these studies.  But so is the conclusion that individuals are 
forming (or, just as likely, reporting) the perceptions of both risks and 
benefits that best express their cultural evaluations of an activity.  In 
that case, the inverse correlation between risks and benefits would re-
flect the expressively rational effect of cultural worldviews, and not the 
irrational impact of emotion, on information processing. 
Another supposed sign of the influence of emotion on informa-
tion processing is the responsiveness of individual risk perceptions to 
the vividness of information.56  The irrational weigher theory treats 
this as further evidence that emotions warp reasoned analysis.  Emo-
tionally gripping depictions of harm (e.g., news coverage of a terrorist 
attack), it is said, are more salient than emotionally sterile ones (e.g., 
stories about the consequences of global warming).57  Accordingly, 
they are more likely to be noticed and recalled, generating the dis-
torted estimation of risks associated with the “availability effect.”58
But again the cultural evaluator model offers an alternative expla-
nation that fits the data just as well, if not better.  The impact of vivid 
information on risk perceptions is conditional on individuals’ cultural 
53 See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:  ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (advocating a holistic, 
values-based approach to risk regulation to contrast to a reductive cost-benefit analy-
sis). 
54 See, e.g., Alhakami & Slovic, supra note 9, at 1085 (finding that this inverse rela-
tionship indicates the confounding of risk and benefit in people’s minds, which is cor-
related to a person’s assessment of an activity). 
55 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 271-72 (discussing the nature of emo-
tional reactions to risk and their effects on behavior). 
56 See id. at 274 -75 (discussing vividness as a variable that plays only a minor role in 
cognitive reactions, but a significant rule in emotional reactions). 
57 See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and 
Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (2007). 
58 See id. at 535. 
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worldviews.  Shown news of a school shooting spree, egalitarians and 
communitarians fix on the horrifying image of dead children and re-
vise upward their assessment of the risks of private gun ownership.  
What captures the attention of hierarchical and individualistic per-
sons, however, is the tragic inability of school personnel to cut the 
massacre short because they were forbidden by law to bring their own 
guns onto school premises—a dreaded outcome that causes them to 
revise upward their assessment of the risk of gun control.59  Likewise, 
terrorism risks loom larger than global warming risks only in the 
imagination of hierarchs, not in the imagination of egalitarians—and 
in the mind of individualists, neither is particularly worrisome.60  Be-
cause all persons of all cultural persuasions have a stake in forming an 
evaluation of the incident that appropriately expresses their values, 
there’s no reason to view anyone’s response to the vividness of the 
story as biased rather than rationally informed by emotion. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn about one last feature of risk 
perceptions often presented as evidence of the biasing effect of emo-
tion.  This is the tendency of public risk perceptions to reinforce and 
feed on themselves.  Irrational weigher theorists depict this phe-
nomenon as a form of “hysteria” or “mass panic.”61  They link it to 
emotion by identifying the cause as “highly vivid cases . . . that receive 
concentrated media attention” resulting in a distorting “interplay be-
tween anxiety, fear, and subjective probabilities.”62
The problem with this argument is that the power of social influ-
ence to amplify perceptions of risk is also known to be highly condi-
tional on individuals’ cultural orientations.  The view that nuclear 
power is dangerous and that global warming is a serious threat is uni-
formly held by egalitarians, but almost uniformly rejected by hierarchs 
and individualists.  Hierarchs have formed a perception that abortion 
is hazardous for women, but other groups have not.  Egalitarians and 
59 See Kahan et al., supra note 42, at 7-8 (examining this phenomenon in the af-
termath of the Virginia Tech massacre); see also Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More 
Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1291, 1314 -15 (2003) (describing the interaction between the availability heuristic and 
cultural worldviews in assessing competing gun risks). 
60 See Kahan et al., supra note 42, at 4, 14 (examining cultural predispositions on 
global warming and terrorism risks). 
61 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 748 (arguing for policy judgments made 
on the basis of “the best possible understanding of reality rather than mass hysteria”); 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 94-98 (discussing the spread of “moral panics” because of 
the cascading effects of social band wagons). 
62 Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 279. 
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communitarians aren’t worried that restrictions on firearms will in-
crease the risk that violent criminals will engage in predation, but in-
dividualists are up in arms about it (as it were). 
For the cultural evaluator theory, the culture-specificity of self-
reinforcing risk perceptions is easy to explain.  Individuals have a 
stake—a perfectly rational one, as people who care about meanings 
and not just about consequences—to form positions on risk that ex-
press their cultural values.  That by itself generates a certain tendency 
toward uniformity of risk perceptions within groups of culturally like-
minded persons.  But insofar as one of the primary sources of infor-
mation people have about the relationship between their values and a 
putatively dangerous activity is what persons who share their commit-
ments think about it,63 perceptions of danger naturally feed upon one 
another among persons who share cultural commitments.64  This form 
of group polarization in risk perceptions, then, is another dynamic 
that can be explained consistently with the view that emotion is a form 
of expressive perception and not a cognitive bias. 
C.  Emotion and Systematic Reasoning:  Substitutes or Complements? 
The experiments I have examined to this point show that emotion 
matters for risk perception, but they don’t address whether emotion is 
functioning as bias or as a form of expressive perception.  A third type 
arguably does both. 
This research relates to how information and emotion interact.  
The irrational weigher theory treats emotion as an heuristic, System 1 
substitute for more considered, System 2 information processing.  It 
follows from this that the situation in which a person is likely to rely 
most decisively on emotion is when she must form an instantaneous 
judgment about a risk about which she has little or no information.  
As people obtain more information on, and have more time to reflect 
about, a novel risk, their judgments should be less affective or emo-
tional.  In this sense, then, the irrational weigher theory hypothesizes 
a negative interaction between information and emotion. 
63 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy:  The Dominating Impact of Group Influence 
on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003). 
64 See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Cul-
ture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 283, 285 (2005) (“Through an 
overlapping set of psychological and social mechanisms, individuals adopt the factual 
beliefs that are dominant among persons who share their cultural orientations.”). 
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The cultural evaluator theory suggests something different.  Ac-
cording to that theory, emotion enables a person to form an attitude 
about risk that appropriately expresses her values.  Emotion can’t re-
liably perform that function, however, if a person lacks sufficient in-
formation to form a coherent judgment about whether crediting it 
would affirm or denigrate her worldview.  On this account, then, emo-
tion can be expected to play a bigger role in the judgment of someone 
who has had access to information and time to reflect on a relatively 
novel risk than someone who has not.  In this sense, the cultural 
evaluator theory predicts a positive interaction between information 
and emotional perception of risk. 
 
Figure 4:  Hypothesized Interactions of Information and Emotion 
 
 
Paul Slovic, Don Braman, Geoff Cohen, John Gastil, and I con-
ducted an experiment to test these competing hypotheses.65  We as-
sessed people’s perceptions of the risks of nanotechnology.  As we ex-
pected, the vast majority of our subjects—about 80%—had heard 
either “little” or “nothing” about this technology before we conducted 
our study.  Nevertheless, close to 90% had an opinion on whether 
nanotechnology’s potential risks would outweigh its potential benefits.  
Not surprisingly, their affective responses to nanotechnology exerted 
65 The nature of the study and the results are analyzed fully in Dan M. Kahan, Paul 
Slovic, Donald Braman, John Gastil & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Affect, Values, and Nanotechnol-
ogy Risk Perceptions:  An Experimental Investigation (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 261, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968652. 
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a strong influence on their perceptions.  But consistent with the pre-
diction of the cultural evaluator theory, and inconsistent with that of 
the irrational weigher theory, the impact of affect relative to other in-
fluences (such as gender, race, or ideology) was significantly larger 
among persons who knew a modest or substantial amount about 
nanotechnology before the study.  Likewise, we found that affect, as 
well as cultural worldviews, played an even bigger role in explaining 
variation among subjects who received information about nanotech-
nology before their views were elicited than in those who did not re-
ceive information first.  Again, these findings suggest that emotion is 
not a heuristic substitute for information, but rather a type of evaluative 
judgment that depends on access to enough information for a person 
to evaluate the social meaning of a putatively dangerous activity. 
 
Figure 5:  Differential Impact of Affect on Nanotechnology 
Risk Perceptions Based on Prior Knowledge 
 
Is this study conclusive in the contest between “emotion as bias” 
and “emotion as expressive perception”?  Definitely not.  But as the 
only study that puts the two squarely in conflict, it underscores the 
importance of resisting the fallacious inference that because emotion 
does not perform the role assigned to it by the (discredited) rational 
weigher model, the function it performs must be an irrational one. 
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III.  NORMATIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Only the conceptions of emotion associated with the irrational 
weigher theory and the cultural evaluator theory fit the data on the 
relationship between emotion and risk perception.  I now want to 
consider what is at stake as a practical matter in the conflict between 
them.  Whether we see emotion as bias or expressive perception, I will 
argue, has immense normative and prescriptive implications for risk 
regulation. 
A.  Expertise—Scientific and Moral 
The normative program associated with the irrational weigher the-
ory has two adversaries.  One is a largely anti-interventionist stance 
that counsels that market forces be trusted to set appropriate levels of 
risk absent manifest externalities, which themselves should be reme-
died through regulations that “mimic” the risk-benefit tradeoffs re-
flected in well-functioning markets.66  If, as the irrational weigher the-
ory asserts, emotions pervade and distort popular beliefs about risk, 
then there is little reason to assume that the decisions people make 
about their own welfare furnish a reliable guide for regulation.67  The 
other adversary is a fundamentally “populist” regime that favors reli-
ance on highly participatory democratic processes to identify appro-
priate levels of risk.  That strategy, according to irrational weighers, 
assures convulsive regulatory responsiveness to the alternating cur-
rents of myopia and hysteria that animate popular risk perceptions.68
66 See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 13, at 114-35 (describing how to set health regula-
tory policy by balancing the cost to firms of compliance with the risk of noncompli-
ance); John Martin Gillroy, Environmental Risk and the Traditional Sector Approach:  Mar-
ket Efficiency at the Core of Environmental Law?, 10 RISK 139, 145 (1999) (“When the 
collective goods nature of public policy problems causes market failures and the true 
price of an item is not reflected in its market value, then the role of the government in 
an efficiency-based regime, is to mimic the market and allocate accordingly, maximiz-
ing social benefit over cost.” (emphasis omitted)). 
67 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of 
Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982) (challenging Viscusi’s “risk pre-
mium” theory of wages and safety precautions by using evidence of cognitive disso-
nance to show that people do not always behave the way economists assume they will). 
68 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 33-51 (1993) (analyzing data displaying the difference between the pub-
lic’s actual perception of risk and expert projections); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 25-26 
(discussing the popular view of risk and its disparity from the purely economic view). 
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In place of these approaches, the irrational weigher theory advo-
cates delegation of regulatory authority to politically insulated, scien-
tifically trained risk experts.  These individuals, it is said, have the in-
formation and technical acumen necessary to engage in reflective, 
System 2 reasoning, free of the biasing effects of emotion.  By install-
ing experts in independent regulatory agencies with which politicians 
cannot (easily) interfere and to which courts are obliged to defer, the 
law inoculates them from the virus of public irrationality. 
Contrary to the objections of the defenders of the pro-market and 
populist strategies, moreover, irrational weigher theorists argue that 
this essentially depoliticized mechanism for intervening in private de-
cision making need not be viewed as disrespectful of either individual 
freedom or self-government.  Since ordinary people presumably 
would disown beliefs that are the product of emotional irrationality, 
regulating them via standards set by independent experts instead con-
forms their conduct to the preferences they would hold, as individuals 
and as a society, if they had the cognitive capacity to form considered 
and rational beliefs.  “When people’s fears lead them in the wrong di-
rections,” Sunstein explains, this form of “libertarian paternalism can 
provide a valuable corrective.”69
The cultural evaluator theory suggests a strong critique of this de-
fense of virtual-representation-by-risk-expert.  According to the cul-
tural evaluator model, most of the phenomena that the irrational 
weigher theory attributes to emotionally biased decision making in 
fact reflects the use of emotion to form expressively rational stances 
toward risk.  If individuals’ factual beliefs are expressive of cultural 
worldviews, then experts who treat those beliefs as “blunders” unenti-
tled to normative respect in a “deliberative democracy”70 are necessar-
ily shielding regulatory law from citizens’ visions of the good society.  
In fact, it is quite debatable whether risk experts’ judgments are as 
impervious to emotion as irrational weigher theorists believe.71  But 
however much more they know than ordinary members of the public 
about the actuarial magnitudes of various risks, the scientific experts 
69 SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 7. 
70 Id. at 126, 1. 
71 See SLOVIC, supra note 7, at 409 (describing data suggesting that “affective and 
sociopolitical factors appear to influence scientists’ risk evaluations in much the same 
way as they influence the public’s perceptions”). 
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certainly possess no special insight on the cultural values society’s laws 
should express.72
It is exactly this mismatch between the sort of technical expertise 
possessed by risk experts and the emotional expertise needed to con-
nect stances toward risk to citizens’ values that informs unease toward 
“cost-benefit” and related welfarist modes of policymaking.73  It’s not 
impossible to imagine the law being coherently informed by such 
methods.  What is impossible to imagine, though, is that the policies 
will adequately engage the difficult expressive questions that risk con-
flicts inevitably present.  If part of what’s troubling (to some) about 
nuclear power is what it would say about our values to leave to future 
generations the problem of dealing with ever-accumulating and for-
ever-toxic wastes, then how does it help to treat the likelihood that fu-
ture generations will in fact find a solution as just another variable in 
the cost-benefit calculus?  If part of what disturbs (some) people about 
gun control is the condition of servility it expresses to cede protection 
of themselves and their families exclusively to the state, how respon-
sive is it to print out a regression analysis that shows more lives are 
saved on net than are lost when handguns are banned?  A form of 
policymaking that deliberately excluded the expressive insight uniquely 
associated with emotional perception would leave a society in a mor-
ally disabled posture analogous to the state of impairment experi-
enced by the emotion-free individuals Damasio describes.74
Nevertheless, this objection to deferring to scientific risk experts 
does not commit the cultural evaluator theory to either the pro-
market or populist programs of risk regulation.  Recognizing that 
emotions enable persons to perceive expressive value doesn’t imply 
that the insight it imparts can never be challenged.75  Indeed, the idea 
that emotions express cognitive evaluations is historically conjoined to 
the position that emotions can and should be evaluated as true or 
72 See generally DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 51, at 80-81 (“Science and risk 
assessment cannot tell us what we need to know about threats of danger since they ex-
plicitly try to exclude moral ideas about the good life.  Where responsibility starts, they 
stop.”). 
73 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 53, at 11 (rejecting expert “eco-
nomic thinking” in policymaking for a more “holistic” approach that restores a “sense 
of moral urgency to the protection of life, health, and the environment”). 
74 See DAMASIO, supra note 36, at 205-22 (describing results from studies on “emo-
tion-free” patients who suffered damage to their “somatic markers”). 
75 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 33, at 47 (challenging the value assumptions in hu-
man emotion). 
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false, right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, in light of the 
moral correctness of the values those emotions express.76
When we appreciate the expressive contribution that emotions 
make to risk perception, we are equipped to discern issues of justice 
that never come into focus under welfarist styles of risk assessment.  
Should a person about to be operated on be entitled to information 
about the risk that he could contract HIV from an infected surgeon?77  
Why not, if we think of the decision as reflecting only the interest a 
prospective patient has in calculating the costs and benefits of her 
treatment options?  But what should our answer be if we know that 
fear of this risk—at least in those who placidly tolerate many larger 
risks incident to surgery—expresses commitment to a hierarchical 
worldview that condemns forms of deviance symbolically associated 
with AIDS?78  Is it appropriate for a legislature to limit access to guns 
in order to avoid the risk of shooting accidents or violent crime?  The 
question is at least a more complicated one if we recognize that part 
of what motivates aversion to these risks is an egalitarian and commu-
nitarian cultural style that despises the individualistic connotations of 
private gun ownership.79
Analogous, and equally difficult, questions arise in other areas of 
law in which emotions figure.80  No set of procedures or doctrines, in 
my view, can ever assure that these issues will be resolved in a just way. 
But the normative complexity that the cultural evaluator theory in-
jects into risk regulation is by no means a reason to shy away from it.  For 
if emotion does indeed figure in our risk perceptions in the way that that 
theory implies, we would certainly be fools not to recognize how de-
pendent risk regulation is on moral, as well as scientific, expertise. 
76 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 286-87 (setting forth the ways that emo-
tion can be evaluated as inappropriate). 
77 See generally Phillip L. McIntosh, When the Surgeon Has HIV:  What To Tell Patients 
About the Risk of Exposure and the Risk of Transmission, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 315 (1996) (ex-
ploring the legal considerations and risk assessments in deciding whether to disclose a 
physician’s HIV infection). 
78 See Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1087 (describing data supporting the conclu-
sion that “hierarchists” worry more than “individualists” about contracting HIV). 
79 See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 134-36 
(2007) (connecting the perception of handgun risks to a partisan cultural worldview). 
80 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 362-72 (discussing the emotional re-
sponses of judges and juries deciding manslaughter cases). 
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B.  On Education of the Emotions 
Even if risk regulation is not just about promoting societal welfare 
measured in instrumental terms, it is still significantly about that.  As 
divided as they might be in their interests in what the law says, hierar-
chists and egalitarians, individualists and communitarians surely have 
a common interest in what the law does to secure them from environ-
mental catastrophe, from disease, from market collapse, and from at-
tacks upon the nation’s security.  What do the two conceptions of 
emotion in risk perception imply about the prospects for making the 
law responsive to the best scientific knowledge we have on how to 
achieve these ends? 
The irrational weigher theory’s message is a discouraging one.  
Trying to educate citizens, according to proponents of this view, is 
even worse than futile.  Not only do citizens lack the time and capacity 
to engage scientifically complex data on risk in a considered, dispas-
sionate way, but precisely because they don’t, exposing them even to 
empirically sound information will often do more harm than good: 
Government is unlikely to be successful if it simply emphasizes the low 
probability that [a feared] risk will come to fruition.  The best approach 
may well be this:  Change the subject . . . . [D]iscussions of low-probability 
risks tend to heighten public concern, even if those discussions consist 
largely of reassurance.  Perhaps the most effective way of reducing fear 
of a low-probability risk is simply to discuss something else and to let 
time do the rest.
81
The cultural evaluator theory, however, generates a more optimis-
tic conclusion.  Historically, the view that emotions are “judgments of 
value” has also been affiliated with the position that emotions can be 
educated.  The type of instruction this approach contemplates, how-
ever, consists not in a stoic program of disciplining the mind and 
strengthening the will to resist the supposedly corrupting influence of 
emotion on judgment.  Instead, it has involved a species of moral in-
struction that reforms a person’s emotional apprehension of the so-
cial meanings that unjust or destructive states of affairs and courses of 
action express.82
Emotional evaluations of risk are likewise subject to education.  As 
the nanotechnology study shows, individuals’ emotions are responsive 
81 SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 125. 
82 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 33, at 218-20, 233, 425-35 (exploring the methods and 
impact of moral education); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 297-301 (contrasting 
mechanistic and evaluative views of moral education). 
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to information.  What individuals’ emotions respond to as they learn 
more, however, is not the expected utility of forgoing or forbearing 
particular risks, but rather the social meaning of doing so.  The pros-
pects for making members of the public receptive to sound empirical 
information, then, doesn’t depend on whether they can be trained not 
to apprehend risk through their emotions; it depends on whether sci-
entifically sound information can be made to bear a social meaning 
that fits citizens’ cultural values. 
As I have discussed elsewhere,83 the cultural evaluator theory sug-
gests that this objective can be achieved through a risk-
communication strategy that employs cultural identity affirmation and 
expressive overdetermination.  In effect, individuals are cognitively moti-
vated to reject information about risk when they perceive that accept-
ing it would threaten their defining group commitments.  To avoid 
this reaction, then, information about risks must be framed in a way 
that affirms rather than denigrates recipients’ cultural identities; to 
make it possible for persons of diverse cultural persuasions to experi-
ence that affirmation simultaneously—and thus reach consensus on a 
contested risk issue—the information must be framed in a way that 
expresses a plurality of social meanings. 
There are many examples of this type of strategy in action.  The 
adoption of tradable emissions—a market mechanism for controlling 
pollution—made it possible for individualists, hierarchists, egalitari-
ans, and communitarians to accept information about effective poli-
cies for securing clean air.  The proposal to use nuclear power to re-
duce reliance on fossil fuel energy sources responsible for global 
warming is making hierarchists and individualists more receptive to 
information about the seriousness of climate change and egalitarians 
and communitarians more receptive to information about the feasibil-
ity of safely producing nuclear energy.84  Donald Braman and I have 
proposed policies that use identity affirmation and expressive overde-
termination to help contending cultural groups converge on sound 
information about gun risks.85
83 See Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1096-1100 (defining and defending cultural 
identity affirmation); Kahan, supra note 79, at 145-53 (defining and defending the 
strategy of expressive overdetermination for reducing cultural conflict). 
84 See Kahan et al., supra note 42, at 4-6 (describing experimental results showing 
this effect). 
85 See Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun 
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics:  Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 
569, 588-95 (2006) (describing an example of the successful use of identity affirmation 
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Whether a program of “deliberative risk communication” of this 
type can succeed is admittedly an open question.  But because it offers 
the only serious hope for making the complex task of risk regulation 
amenable to meaningful self-government, the risk of its failure is well 
worth taking. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have examined both the growing evidence on 
emotions and risk perception and how that evidence should be inter-
preted.  It is settled at this point that emotions play a critical role in 
the cognition of risk, a finding that further undermines the already 
tenuous foundations of the classic, “rational weigher” theory of risk 
perception.  But commentators, I have argued, have been much too 
quick to infer that emotions therefore contribute to the deformation 
of public risk perceptions asserted by the now dominant “irrational 
weigher” theory.  Another conception of emotion—not as bias but as 
expressive perception—fits the evidence just as well (indeed, perhaps 
even better).  On this account, emotions play a critical role in perfect-
ing the function that risk perceptions play as rational expressions of 
value under the emerging cultural evaluator theory. 
The recent literature on the role of emotion in risk perceptions, 
then, has not resolved the classic debate on the relationship between 
emotion and reason.  It has only moved that debate to a new location, 
one in which the stakes are incredibly high.  An error in one direction 
could compromise our society’s safety and welfare.  But an error in 
the other could just as easily cost the public a meaningful voice in de-
ciding how our society should address the major issues of our time. 
We should proceed with an open mind in our continued investi-
gation of what emotion contributes to risk perception and what its 
significance is for risk regulation.  But we ought to be motivated as 
well by a morally discerning fear of all we stand to lose if we reach the 
wrong conclusion. 
and expressive overdetermination to resolve a dispute between Native American 
groups and the scientific community). 
